The Strategic Logic of SVBIEDs – Part 1 – Mirroring the Conventional 

The Strategic Logic of SVBIEDs – Part 1 – Mirroring the Conventional 

Note: This article was written in the latter half of 2021, and has NOT been factually updated since then. I am publishing it in its original state, without edits.

The use of suicide car bombs, or Suicide Vehicle-Borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) by non-state actors has evolved substantially over the past decade. The SVBIED, which was previously synonymous with a covert approach where the rigged vehicle was indistinguishable from regular civilian traffic, has effectively been adapted to conventional warfare by the application of improvised armor plating to the vehicles. While this might seem trivial, it has elevated the SVBIED from a tool of terror to also being a weapon of war, something that has allowed multiple non-state actors the ability to challenge their state military opponents head on. With the SVBIED as a central tenet of their military strategies, groups like al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) have attempted to bridge the military gap between themselves and their opponents, succeeding at times. Over time, these groups have successively refined their strategies, tactics, as well as the designs of their up-armored SVBIEDs in order to gain an advantage on the battlefield.

The extensive application of the up-armored SVBIED in a more conventional military role by these non-state actors has facilitated their takeover and subsequent defense of territorial holdings, and has simultaneously highlighted how the SVBIED has emerged as a powerful and versatile weapon meant to replace a non-state actor’s lack of a proper air force. In this context, the old comparison of the SVBIED as “the poor man’s air force” [1] even more apt.

Although there’s a multitude of non-state actors that have used covert SVBIEDs in the past forty years, only a handful have managed to successfully transition to using up-armored SVBIEDs in recent years. While drawing from previous experience of the Islamic State’s use of up-armored SVBIEDs across Iraq, Syria, and Libya, this article will compare and contrast them to the non-state actors currently using this weapon – including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Taliban, as well as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) – in order to highlight a geographically widespread but recurring pattern of similar designs, tactics, and strategies. Furthermore, the article will look at the few non-state actors that have gone full circle – from covert, to up-armored, and back again – in order to highlight the adaptability of the weapon. With this, it’s useful to begin by exploring why these groups switch from covert to up-armored SVBIEDs in the first place.

Mirroring The Conventional

Non-state actors engaged in armed fighting against an overwhelmingly powerful state military opponent often engage in irregular warfare – not because they’re particularly fond of the fighting style – but because it offers advantages to a militarily weaker force. By avoiding direct confrontations and instead laying ambushes, IEDs, as well as engaging in raids and assassinations, the irregular force is able to capitalize on its relative weakness and instead conduct irregular operations with a higher chance of success. When a situation emerges where an increasingly powerful irregular force fights a weakening state, the likelihood increases that the irregular force will attempt to mirror the conventional in order to challenge the state for superiority. And as this article will showcase, that urge to mirror the conventional extends into the military application of the SVBIED as well.

Of all the different tools available to an irregular force, the covert SVBIED stands out as the most powerful. Hezbollah’s infamous introduction of the suicide car bomb was revolutionizing in its tactical implications, as it was suddenly possible to deliver large quantities of explosives directly to an unwitting target. Since that pivotal moment, and up until about a decade ago, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) had been the most pioneering in their use of covert SVBIEDs as a military tool, as they would sometimes use them in order to initiate large-scale infantry attacks on rural Sri Lankan Army outposts, beginning in the mid-1980s [1]. However, the LTTE attacks were isolated in nature [2].

Although the Islamic State (IS) stands out as an extreme outlier when it comes to prolonged, large-scale use of up-armored SVBIEDs – employing at least 1410 in the two years of 2016-2017 [4] – their predecessors did not use any at all, despite the large quantities of covert SVBIEDs they hurled at every part of society during the Iraq War. While the extensive presence of foreign troops and air power played a large role in keeping the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) at bay, there were indications of a shift as early as 2007 [5]. The group already had a tried and tested modus operandi at the time, and had even begun adding modifications to their vehicles. Despite their reliance on stealth and infiltration, the group’s covert SVBIEDs were in some cases fitted with limited sections of improvised armor plating to the interior of the driver’s cabin [6]. This was done in case the driver was discovered before reaching their designated target, thereby potentially increasing the chances of success.

Two Islamic State of Iraq covert SVBIEDs with interior armor kits, dated ca 2007-2009.
Two Islamic State of Iraq covert SVBIEDs with interior armor kits, dated ca 2007-2009.

When the United States (US) withdrew from Iraq in 2011, ISI had been effectively decimated and ground down [7]. However, it didn’t take long for the group to rebound as they capitalized on the power vacuum left by the absence of US forces [8]. While continuing their parked VBIED and covert SVBIED attacks throughout Iraq, ISIS also expanded across the border into Syria in 2013, where opposition-held areas provided the perfect staging area and testing ground. Beginning around this time – and accelerating in 2014 – ISIS redirected a large part of its SVBIED use toward overtly capturing territory in both countries, seizing town after town as their opponents fled [9].

In their quest for a territorial ‘caliphate’, IS successively captured increasing numbers of armored vehicles, tanks, artillery pieces, as well as other heavy weaponry, which they reinserted into combat on their own side, shifting the fighting in a more conventional direction. The process of capturing and holding territory generated clear front lines between the group and its opponents, and also had a substantial effect on the way it employed SVBIEDs. With demarcated front lines, any vehicle was automatically more exposed when going on the offensive. And with its principal reliance on stealth and infiltration, the advantage of using covert SVBIEDs was thus instantly negated. In order to adapt the weapon to the new battlefield situation, IS began outfitting their SVBIEDs with more comprehensive improvised armor plating in order to shield the driver, vehicle, and explosives from incoming fire up until the intended point of detonation. 

IS up-armored SVBIED used during the capture of Mosul city in June 2014.
IS up-armored SVBIED used during the capture of Mosul city in June 2014.

With this move, IS had adapted the use of SVBIEDs to the conventional battlefield, fully realizing its military application. Alongside the trove of heavy equipment in their possession, the group began consistently incorporating up-armored SVBIEDs as powerful force multipliers meant to soften hardened targets prior to and during armored assaults [10]. In this context, the old comparison of the covert SVBIED to “the poor man’s air force” [11] – because of its ability to deliver large quantities of explosives to a specific target – was rendered even more accurate, as IS started using their up-armored SVBIEDs on the battlefield en masse, similar to how a state’s air force would conduct aerial bombing campaigns in support of ground forces in armed conflicts [12].

For example, the takeover of Ramadi in the spring of 2015 involved upwards of 30 up-armored SVBIEDs that were used in order to damage or destroy key positions prior to ground assaults [13]. Over the years, the group would develop ever-more intricate tactical procedures, at times using bulldozers to allow SVBIEDs access through earth berms [14], emplacing portable bridges to cross over trenches [15], and even using drone support teams in order to guide SVBIED drivers to their targets in real-time [16]. While the overwhelming majority of all SVBIED attacks during the height of IS expansion across Iraq and Syria were used in battle, the territory they possessed also facilitated the parallel use of covert SVBIEDs in places like Baghdad, which continuously resulted in horrific death tolls.

Multiple IS up-armored SVBIEDs used during the Tel Skuf offensive North of Mosul on May 3, 2016
Multiple IS up-armored SVBIEDs used during the Tel Skuf offensive North of Mosul on May 3, 2016

Although the conventional use of up-armored SVBIEDs can be likened to “the poor man’s air force”, it’s a long way from actually being able to replace the lack of an air force. Being a land-based weapon, it’s chronically exposed to aerial attacks. IS’ meteoric ascension across both Iraq and Syria was built on the unstable and weak nature of both states and their militaries, and the US entrance to the conflict in August 2014 marked a major turning point [17]. As US air strikes practically neutered the offensive military potential of IS’ up-armored SVBIEDs – in that the group was no longer able to expand their territorial control unhindered – IS continued using them regardless, eventually rendering them the main defensive tools by which the group tried to spearhead limited offensives and harass advancing enemy troops, slowing down its successive territorial losses in the process [18] [19].

IS up-armored SVBIED captured by PMU-Hashd near Mosul in July 2017.
IS up-armored SVBIED captured by PMU-Hashd near Mosul in July 2017.

Seeing as IS relied heavily on its use of up-armored SVBIEDs, these vehicles became one of the main targets of the US air force, together with their manufacturing sites [20]. However, IS were quick to develop new designs meant to counteract the increasing military pressure felt by the group. Although the group had already made extensive use of angled armor plates, as well as improvised slat armor mounted at a distance from the vehicle’s regular armor kit [21], the aerial threat reoriented their design focus [22]. By coordinating the manufacturing efforts of its vast network of SVBIED workshop, more advanced standardized designs soon emerged.

Beginning in 2016, IS started using up-armored SVBIEDs with environmental paint schemes meant to give the modified vehicles a semblance of camouflage – and potentially slow the response time of the defenders, if only for a while – during the vehicles’ approach [23]. While the initial examples were painted in a desert color meant to match the surroundings of large swathes of Iraq and Syria [24], IS would go on to use up-armored SVBIEDs during the battles of Mosul and Raqqah that were painted to look like civilian vehicles, with many of the upwards of 500 [25] up-armored SVBIEDs used during the battle of Mosul even sporting fake windshields, grilles, and tires painted on their armor kits. Alongside these improved designs, IS regularly utilized SVBIED support teams that followed the vehicles with quadcopter drones and communicated with the drivers via radio, facilitating navigation and allowing them to circumvent enemy defenses in real-time, a tactic that proved particularly effective in urban fighting [26].

IS-uparmored SVBIED with environmental paint scheme used during the battle of Western Mosul on April 13, 2017
IS-uparmored SVBIED with environmental paint scheme used during the battle of Western Mosul on April 13, 2017

Although the continuous effort to refine and improve their up-armored SVBIED designs highlighted the centrality of the weapon to IS’ conventional military strategy, they were ultimately not enough to offset the advantage held by the US air force, as evidenced by the group’s loss of its territorial caliphate across Iraq/Syria in early 2019 [27]. However, this balancing of military strength vis-a-vis up-armored SVBIEDs and air power has been observed more than half a dozen times, with different non-state actors and across multiple continents.

Parallel to the fight over IS’ core territories in Iraq and Syria, the group’s Libyan contingent also completed a transition to using up-armored SVBIEDs. Borne out of a group of returned IS foreign fighters, the Libyan IS contingent was set up with assistance from high-level IS officials who were dispatched in late 2014 by central IS leadership [28] alongside IS fighters of Libyan origin [29]. Although the group maintained an early presence in both Benghazi and Derna, their greatest overt feat came with the capturing of the Mediterranean city of Sirte in 2015 [30] and their subsequent acquisition of a sizable strip of coastal territory. With the introduction of up-armored SVBIEDs, IS’ Libyan arm would go on to incorporate them into their military strategy as well, fighting a conventional multi-front war. Interestingly, while the IS contingents in Sirte, Benghazi, and Derna were geographically separated, they all transitioned to using up-armored SVBIEDs in a conventional military role once they captured territory.

IS up-armored SVBIED captured by Libya Dawn forces near Sirte on July 2, 2016.
IS up-armored SVBIED captured by Libya Dawn forces near Sirte on July 2, 2016.

Unsurprisingly, IS’ expansion in Libya came in the wake of the second Libyan civil war, as the two main warring sides were busy repositioning themselves militarily, leaving power vacuums that IS exploited to its advantage. However, IS in Libya would also come face to face with the US air force. As local coalitions assembled to drive IS out from their urban territorial holdings, the US contributed with reconnaissance missions and air strikes on IS targets [31]. By early 2017, IS had lost both Sirte, Benghazi, and Derna, and were effectively relegated to their rural desert strongholds. 

IS up-armored SVBIED captured by Sirte Protection Forces between SIrte-Abugrein on May 20, 2016.
IS up-armored SVBIED captured by Sirte Protection Forces between SIrte-Abugrein on May 20, 2016.

Since their fall from overt territorial control due to the introduction of qualitative air power on the side of their opponents, IS in Syria, Iraq, as well as Libya, have all gone full circle and reverted back to using covert SVBIEDs as a form of irregular warfare, showing the highly adaptable nature of both the organizations and the SVBIED. And while military pressure is still being exerted in order to stifle their potential reemergence, the threat is real and attacks are still being conducted. Although IS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya are all past users of up-armored SVBIEDs, their current weakness should not be taken for granted as future transitions are possible, should the situation on the ground deteriorate. As the cases of AQIM and al-Shabaab will highlight in the next article, and as this article also illustrates, the successful transition to and efficient use of up-armored SVBIEDs hinges primarily on – among other things – the absence of a potent enemy air force.

Beyond IS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, there are three non-state actors who have completed transitions and are either currently using up-armored SVBIEDs, or were using them up until recently; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Taliban, as well as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). By detailing the trajectories of these three non-state actors and examining their current situations, the conventional logic of employing up-armored SVBIEDs and its comparison with modern air power will be further elucidated.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is the most powerful Syrian opposition faction, and currently rules what remains of the country’s Northwestern Idlib province [32]. Beginning as a secret offshoot of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in late 2011 under the name Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN), the group eventually entrenched themselves within the wider Syrian opposition by providing well-trained, disciplined fighters and potent suicide bombers [33]. In the first year of the Syrian Civil War, JaN would carry out multiple high-profile covert SVBIED attacks in major cities against targets linked to the Syrian state, resulting in a number of civilian fatalities [34]. However, as the opposition became increasingly powerful, JaN instead began employing covert SVBIEDs as part of attacks against isolated Syrian loyalist checkpoints and bases in the countryside [35]. With their ranks swelled by defections and their weapons and armored vehicles multiplied by continuous seizures, the opposition began engaging Syrian loyalist forces conventionally in 2013, resulting in a large-scale overt capturing of territory [36]. Here, JaN began its transition to using up-armored SVBIEDs as part of their joint assaults on Syrian loyalist positions [37].

JaN up-armored SVBIED used against Syrian loyalist position in Damascus suburbs on February 6, 2013.
JaN up-armored SVBIED used against Syrian loyalist position in Damascus suburbs on February 6, 2013.

Despite some setbacks, the majority of opposition forces coalesced in Northwestern Syria by early 2015. At this point, most of the up-armored SVBIEDs used by JaN were based on seized armored personnel carriers, most often the Soviet-made BMP-1 [38]. With its built-in armor, large rear compartment, and tracks, it made for a perfect shell vehicle. And the large surplus of armored vehicles acquired in the preceding years meant that a substantial amount of them could be dedicated to suicide bombings without negatively impacting conventional military operations [39]. This general phenomenon has been observed with the majority of other non-state actors that have transitioned to using up-armored SVBIEDs as well.

After forming an Islamist rebel coalition (Jaish al-Fatah) headed by JaN, the bloc commenced an offensive meant to assert full military control over Syria’s Idlib province [40]. During the following three months, JaN would employ more than a dozen up-armored SVBIEDs based on BMP-1s, facilitating the successive and complete expulsion of Syrian loyalist forces from Idlib province and the rebel capture of multiple population centers, including Idlib city [41] and Jisr al-Shughour [42]. Even though the Idlib offensive was hailed as an enormous victory, it would have grave consequences.

JaN up-armored BMP-1 SVBIED used against Syrian loyalist position at Qormid base, Idlib in April, 2015.
JaN up-armored BMP-1 SVBIED used against Syrian loyalist position at Qormid base, Idlib in April, 2015.

The Syrian army and air force’s inability to hold Idlib province in the face of an armed rebel onslaught, powered by the repeated use of up-armored SVBIEDs, resulted in Syrian loyalist leadership requesting Russian military assistance, which quickly altered the balance of power [43].

The introduction of the Russian air force – alongside military advisors and special forces – had an effect similar to that of the US aerial counter-IS mission. When JaN spearheaded multiple offensives in and around Aleppo the next year and used upwards of 30 up-armored SVBIEDs as part of an attempt to regain territory lost to Russian-backed loyalist offensives, aerial pressure left them unable to hold the territory they briefly seized back [44]. Since then, the group’s use of SVBIEDs (and their general military strategy) has shifted in an entirely defensive direction [45]. With their stocks of armored vehicles severely depleted as well, JaN (then HTS) began primarily relying on civilian shell vehicles [46].

HTS up-armored SVBIED used at the Soruj front near Abu Duhur on January 20, 2018.
HTS up-armored SVBIED used at the Soruj front near Abu Duhur on January 20, 2018.

In the wake of the decisive battles of Idlib and Aleppo, HTS continued losing territory while employing up-armored SVBIEDs in an attempt to mitigate total collapse [47]. This eventually culminated in the 2019-20 Idlib offensive, where HTS lost more than 40% of their remaining territory despite using more than 35 up-armored SVBIEDs during the ten-month long ordeal [48]. As they found themselves under intense aerial pressure in a shrinking area, HTS – like IS – evolved under pressure, also introducing up-armored SVBIEDs with environmental paint schemes tailored specifically to the natural surroundings of Northwest Syria [49]. The yellow and green designs – which were used on the open plains and in forested areas respectively – were just one development among many.

Two HTS up-armored SVBIEDs with environmental pain scheme. Unofficial photo from late December 2019.
Two HTS up-armored SVBIEDs with environmental pain scheme. Unofficial photo from late December 2019.
HTS-Tawhid va Jihod up-armored SVBIED with environmental paint scheme used at Deir al-Kabira on March 1, 2020.
HTS-Tawhid va Jihod up-armored SVBIED with environmental paint scheme used at Deir al-Kabira on March 1, 2020.

HTS would also rely heavily on the use of SVBIED support teams with drones, something that was pioneered by IS during the battle of Mosul [50]. However, HTS’ focus on navigation went a step further, with the group mounting tablets with target coordinates in the driver’s cabin alongside live camera feeds wired to exterior night vision cameras [51]. Despite HTS themselves proclaiming that “The [SVBIED] keeps evolving, day after day” [52], technical developments mattered little in the face of the overwhelming military force encountered on the battlefield.

While the group’s use of up-armored SVBIEDs certainly had an effect in terms of slowing down the loyalist advance, that effect was negligible compared to what actually stopped the advance; air power. The Turkish air force played a key role in stopping further territorial losses by repeatedly and consistently striking loyalist military positions in late February 2020 until a ceasefire was negotiated [53]. Although reports have emerged since then alleging that HTS have decided to stop using SVBIEDs altogether, partly as part of an effort to garner international legitimacy, but also due to the weapon’s inability to contain the most recent loyalist advance, this supposed decision likely hinges on Turkey’s willingness to militarily protect the group and the little territory they cling on to [54]. At any rate, HTS and its use of up-armored SVBIEDs doesn’t constitute a threat to any state actor at the moment, and likely won’t in the future either. (EDIT: lol)

Still, out of all non-state actors using up-armored SVBIEDs, HTS has been the most vocal about the underlying military logic of using the weapon. This was made overly clear in a December, 2019 video wholly dedicated to the group’s use of SVBIEDs. Against the visual backdrop of US drones, helicopters, and airstrikes, the narrator presented the up-armored SVBIED as a precise and lethal weapon comparable to the “guided [air-to-ground] missiles” used by air forces across the world [55]. When HTS’ use of SVBIEDs was questioned during an interview in 2021, the group’s leader elaborated, saying that “it’s a weapon”, and that “if we had [an air force], we would have used [that] instead” [56]. This clearly highlights the group’s own military-strategic reasoning behind using up-armored SVBIEDs, and how it’s positioned as “the poor man’s air force”. Beyond that, HTS also refers back to the “progress” that the use of SVBIEDs has yielded in places like Afghanistan [57].

The Taliban

For the first decade of its existence, the Taliban were ideologically opposed to the notion of suicide bombings, or ‘martyrdom operations’, as they are often referred to [58]. However, when the group found itself deposed from power in the wake of the US invasion, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI, a predecessor to IS) convinced Taliban leadership – partly by showing videos of such attacks in Iraq – to adopt the strategy in order to be able to strike back from a position of weakness [59]. Beginning in 2005, the Taliban would conduct hundreds of suicide bombings, the majority in the early years using suicide belts and vests [60]. However, the group also carried out covert SVBIED attacks against Afghan National Army (ANA) and foreign forces in urban environments as well as the countryside, regularly going after convoys, checkpoints, and bases [61].

During this time, the large presence of foreign forces and air power prevented the Taliban from leveraging their use of covert SVBIEDs into military momentum, rendering their effect largely intimidative and punitive [62]. In this way, the situation somewhat resembled AQI – and later ISI’s – situation during the Iraq War. However, as foreign forces largely withdrew and the remainder shifted to an advisory role in 2014 [63], the Taliban began exploiting their newfound freedom of movement. Incrementally, the group began overrunning ANA positions, capturing increasing numbers of US-made armored vehicles [64] – mostly Humvees – and even briefly seized control of Kunduz in September, 2015 [65].

As part of their shift from irregular to conventional warfare, the Taliban began using captured Humvees as up-armored SVBIEDs in early 2016 in order to facilitate their aim of seizing territory [66]. The use of armored vehicles as SVBIEDs followed the trends of both IS and Jabhat al-Nusra, though specifically the former as IS pioneered [67] the use of seized Humvees as up-armored SVBIEDs in the nascent days of its territorial ‘caliphate’ [68]. The use of captured Humvees as SVBIEDs served a two-fold purpose for the Taliban, as they were sometimes mistaken for friendly troops by the ANA but at the same time armored to a degree in case they received incoming fire [69]. This dual-purpose was exploited by IS as well, with multiple documented cases of Humvee SVBIEDs being mistaken for friendly troops [70].

Taliban Humvee SVBIED used against ANA base in Sangin, from October 20, 2016 video.
Taliban Humvee SVBIED used against ANA base in Sangin, from October 20, 2016 video.
Taliban Humvee SVBIED used against ANA base in Sangin, from October 20, 2016 video.
Taliban Humvee SVBIED used against ANA base in Sangin, from October 20, 2016 video.

In the following years, the Taliban would increase their use of Humvee SVBIEDs and further expand their territorial control across rural Afghanistan. The group would refine their tactics along the way, with increasingly complex operations [71] involving multiple up-armored SVBIEDs [72] and follow-on infantry assaults as a result [73]. Although the Taliban had maintained a parallel practice of using devastating covert SVBIEDs [74] in major urban cities like Kabul [75], the group ended these attacks as part of the fateful US-Taliban peace treaty in early 2020 [76]. The agreement – which mandated a full US withdrawal the following year – emboldened the Taliban, who in turn reoriented its focus toward setting the stage for a complete military takeover of the country. As “intra-Afghan negotiations” were set to begin in the fall of 2020 [77], the Taliban commenced an intensive military campaign across the countryside, using dozens of up-armored SVBIEDs in order to knock out isolated ANA bases and besiege major population centers [78]. During this time, the group’s use of quadcopter drones in order to film these attacks also escalated, indicating the cultivation of SVBIED support teams akin to those of IS and HTS [79]. As the Taliban onslaught intensified, the US air force withdrew [80] and US ground forces abandoned major bases [81], tilting the balance of power even further in favor of the Taliban, who had doubled their control of Afghan districts between 2018 and early 2021 [82].

Taliban up-armored Humvee SVBIED featured in an official 2019 video.
Nighttime Taliban drone footage of SVBIED detonation at ANA outpost in Nangarhar on Jan 29, 2021.
Nighttime Taliban drone footage of SVBIED detonation at ANA outpost in Nangarhar on Jan 29, 2021.

During the last 12 months leading up to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, the group used at least 140 up-armored SVBIEDs as part of this strategy [83]. And while surrender deals brokered by village elders played a major part in the Taliban’s eventual victory [84], the group’s use of SVBIEDs laid the military foundation for these surrenders to take place. The continuous takeover of rural districts by the group in the first half of 2021 was primarily a result of the group’s use of SVBIEDs, as isolated ANA contingents who didn’t surrender were explicitly targeted [85]. In this context, the Taliban’s use of SVBIEDs functioned as a persuasive threat that underlined the consequences of refusing to capitulate. In the wake of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the group’s senior leadership has openly repeated this notion, saying that the use of suicide bombers “played a decisive role in the jihadist victory against the US and its allies in Afghanistan” [86]. During a parade celebrating their victory, another senior Taliban leader asserted that out of all the weapons used by the group, the (S)VBIED had been the most prominent piece of ‘military equipment’ [87].

Since the Taliban has progressed from being a weak non-state actor to becoming the de facto state in Afghanistan, they no longer need to employ SVBIEDs as their primary military goal has been achieved. Units of prospective suicide bombers have instead been rebranded as a form of ‘special forces’ [88], in a move similar to the rumored transfer of HTS’ prospective suicide bombers to the group’s famed ‘red band’ units [89]. The sudden redundancy of the Taliban’s suicide bombers is reminiscent of Hezbollah’s decision to stop conducting SVBIED attacks – the last of which took place in 1999 – which coincided with Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon but also reflected the group’s increasing conventional military capabilities [90]. Hezbollah’s quest to mirror the conventional was most recently showcased by the group acting as an auxiliary counter-insurgency force in support of Syrian loyalist forces [91].

The primary SVBIED threat in Afghanistan does not come from the Taliban, but rather other non-state actors that operate within or in close proximity to the country and were emboldened by the fall of the Afghan state, such as ISKP and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). The Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) [92] has taken advantage of the security vacuum left by the sudden collapse of the former Afghan state, and has steadily increased the complexity of its attacks since then. After an operational pause following the deadly Kabul airport attack [93], ISKP has since carried out more than half a dozen further suicide bombings. Using a two-sided approach, the group has targeted both Shia religious sites in Kandahar [94] and Kunduz [95] in order to stoke sectarian tension, but also Taliban leadership in Kabul multiple [96] times [97]. ISKP’s most recent attack in Kabul involved multiple operatives wearing suicide belts and the detonation of a parked VBIED [98]. The inclusion of the latter was a first since the Taliban takeover, and indicates that ISKP will continue using parked VBIEDs and eventually progress to covert SVBIEDs as time passes. Currently, there are no serious restrictions to ISKP’s operational freedom as the Taliban’s lack of air power and loose grip on security [99] has allowed the former to spread its cells across the country relatively unimpeded [100]. Although ISKP will likely present a threat to the Taliban for the foreseeable future, that threat is unlikely to become existential in nature. 

Considering all the similarities regarding how different non-state actors employ covert and up-armored SVBIEDs, the question of whether or not these groups have developed similar tactics and designs independently is central. Although the clear majority of all non-state actors that use or have used SVBIEDs were taught by another non-state actor [101], the transition from covert to up-armored SVBIED is a very logical process. The application of improvised armor plating to civilian vehicles is a century-old phenomenon [102] and a regular occurrence in armed conflicts to this day – with the Mexican cartel wars as a good example [103] – and is done for the same reasons why non-state actors cover their SVBIEDs in armor plating.

Mexican self-defense group up-armored vehicle near el Terrero, Michoacan on January 14, 2021. Photo by AP/Armando Solis.
Mexican self-defense group up-armored vehicle near el Terrero, Michoacan on January 14, 2021. Photo by AP/Armando Solis.

In this context, the comparison between IS in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra (now HTS) is very interesting, seeing as the latter was a covert branch of IS for the first few years of its existence, before the two groups had a falling out and began fighting each other openly. JaN definitely received a substantial amount of knowledgeable personnel, information, and guidance on how to employ its SVBIEDs, but that association had been severed by December 2013, just two years after the group’s inception [104]. Although JaN (and later HTS) has taken its own specific approach to the design and use of up-armored SVBIEDs since then, they feature the same general components and are still employed in a manner similar to that of its former parent group. Another example that highlights the importance of guidance and training is al-Shabaab, who prior to their joining of al-Qaeda decreased their use of SVBIEDs in Mogadishu and Kismayo between 2006-2009 when these cities came under attack by the Ethiopian Army because they had no concept of a conventional military use of up-armored SVBIEDs at the time [105]. However, there is one group that exemplifies the clearest and most direct transfer of information, know-how, and expertise regarding the manufacturing of up-armored SVBIEDs; The Islamic State in West Africa.

The Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP)

Based out of the tri-border Lake Chad area in Nigeria’s Northeastern Borno province, Boko Haram garnered international infamy due to its extensive use of young children and women as suicide bombers [106], and its repeated kidnappings of hundreds of schoolchildren [107]. Although the group joined IS [108] and managed to seize most of Borno province in 2015, they were beaten back by the Nigerian army, augmented by regional militaries [109] organized under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) [110]. Fueled by internal strife in the wake of the group’s military setbacks, Boko Haram fractured in 2016 [111]. The breakaway faction retained official ties to IS, and would continue operations under the name ‘Islamic State West Africa Province’ (ISWAP) [112].

As part of an effort to reorganize and strengthen ISWAP, central IS leadership provided sizable financial assistance [113]and leveraged its Libyan contingent in service of the new flagship wilaya. In the following years, almost a dozen convoys of ISWAP fighters travelled to IS training camps in Libya [114] – later returning alongside IS advisors [115] – some of which were of Arab origin [116] and hailing from Syria/Iraq [117]. Bolstered by the presence of foreign IS advisors who refined ISWAP’s recruitment process and training camps, the group went on the offensive, overrunning at least 14 Nigerian army bases across Northern Borno in 2018 [118].

At this point, ISWAP also transitioned to using up-armored SVBIEDs. While Boko Haram had made extensive use of covert SVBIEDs in the past, these were primarily employed in a sectarian and punitive fashion, often as part of attempts to massacre as many civilians as possible [119]. On the contrary, ISWAP began showcasing its conventional use of up-armored SVBIEDs in 2018 [120]. The foreign IS advisors – who emphasized the need to recruit blacksmiths, welders, auto repairmen, as well as other people with technical skills [121] – had a remarkable impact on the design of ISWAP’s initial up-armored SVBIEDs, which were practically identical to standardised examples from Iraq and Syria. By going directly from basic covert SVBIEDs, to up-armored SVBIEDs with complete armor kits, including wheelhouse protection, angled armor, and improvised frontal slat armor, it was crystal clear that a direct transfer of SVBIED technology and know-how had taken place.

ISWAP up-armored SVBIED featured in July 11, 2018 video release.
ISWAP up-armored SVBIED featured in July 11, 2018 video release.

As a result of its continuous fighting against the Nigerian Army and its allies, ISWAP began regularly capturing armored vehicles as well. Though some were initially reinserted into combat on their own side, the majority were destroyed due to the group’s inability to keep them operational. However, ISWAP also started “recycling” some of its seized armored vehicles by transplanting armor cutouts onto its own up-armored SVBIEDs. This suited the group well considering its relatively poor resource availability, and was facilitated by its newfound focus on recruiting metal workers. Since early 2019, ISWAP has employed roughly a dozen up-armored SVBIEDs, the majority sporting transplanted armor sections from seized armored vehicles such as the Otokar Cobra, Mowag Piranha, and Isotrex Phantom 2 [122]. This reinforced the notion of a direct transfer of SVBIED knowledge from IS central, seeing as the process of mounting transplanted armor sections was pioneered by IS in Iraq [123].

ISWAP up-armored SVBIED captured at Baga on January 20, 2019.
ISWAP up-armored SVBIED captured at Baga on January 20, 2019.

ISWAP’s subsequent use of standardized multi-purpose IEDs made from steel pipes [124], alongside the group’s recent introduction of environment-specific paint schemes on its up-armored SVBIEDs [125] has further added to this notion.

SWAP up-armored SVBIED captured at Monguno on June 13, 2020.
SWAP up-armored SVBIED captured at Monguno on June 13, 2020.
ISWAP up-armored SVBIED captured at Damboa on June 3, 2021.
ISWAP up-armored SVBIED captured at Damboa on June 3, 2021.

Parallel to its use of increasingly complex SVBIED designs, ISWAP has also used transplanted armor in order to manufacture reinforced technicals [126] as well as troop transport vehicles [127]  [128] , and recently highlighted its increasing use of seized armored vehicles in their stated roles [129]. Currently, ISWAP stands out as the only IS branch in the world fielding heavy armor and artillery [130]. Despite the Nigerian aerial superiority – as well as sporadic MNJTF offensives – ISWAP has consistently rebounded from setbacks and remains an incredibly potent force [131]. The poorly coordinated and scattered nature of the MNJTF [132], coupled with the questionable quality of the Nigerian air force [133], has complicated counterinsurgency operations and accentuated the severity of the militant threat. On top of this, the summer of 2021 saw ISWAP neutralizing the original Boko Haram faction [134] – its key rival – swelling the former’s ranks and territorial control in Northeastern Nigeria [135].

In the face of this threat, the Nigerian army has entered into a military stalemate with ISWAP. Although the latter conducts regular attacks against outposts, bases – even super camps – the Nigerian army has so far been able to defend and maintain urban centers across Borno [136]. Although ISWAP’s conventional use of up-armored SVBIEDs is impressive in its design, there has only been a dozen documented or claimed cases since 2018. Furthermore, at least a quarter of those have been disabled and captured during ISWAP offensives and raids. Notwithstanding the group’s occasional tactical mishaps, the comparatively small number of recorded attacks is quite logical.

ISWAP up-armored SVBIED used at Alagorno on June 23, 2019.
ISWAP up-armored SVBIED used at Alagorno on June 23, 2019.

The spectacularly high levels of up-armored SVBIED use maintained by IS across Iraq and Syria between 2014-2019 was made possible by the group’s extraordinary resource availability, which in turn was rooted in its prolonged control of many urban centers [137]. IS’ manufacturing of up-armored SVBIEDs in Iraq and Syria was centered around the cities of Mosul and Raqqah respectively, with clusters of SVBIED workshops in and around these two cities supplementing adjacent areas and directing the flow of modified vehicles to the most active currentfront lines [138]. ISWAP, which maintains no major urban territorial holdings and uses rural Northeastern Nigeria as a staging area, reportedly also suffer from a shortage of explosives, seriously constraining the expansion of its SVBIED program [139]. Although the stalemate vis-a-vis ISWAP and the Nigerian army continues, the unreliable nature of MNJTF and the Nigerian air force indicate that it’s more frail than many assume. If ISWAP is able to consolidate and capitalize on the successes it’s had in 2021, this could provide the group with newfound momentum.

Countermeasures

As non-state actors have adapted and refined their SVBIED designs, tactics, and overall strategies, countermeasures have been developed by their state opponents in order to stifle the weapon’s effectiveness and success rate. Seeing as different types of SVBIEDs (covert/up-armored) are employed in distinct ways, countermeasures have also been tailored to meet the threat posed by each variety. The covert SVBIED’s heavy reliance on stealth means that interdiction en route is substantially more difficult than with its conventional counterpart. Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), coupled with precision aerial strikes and ground raids on key nodes in a non-state actor’s SVBIED program (including manufacturing sites, smuggling networks, facilitative units, as well as attack cells) is all the more crucial in this context in order to prevent attacks before they take place.

Depending on the nature of the non-state actor’s targeting regime, preparing for and defending against an attack is an intricate problem. While military bases and outposts outside of urban centers can dig anti-SVBIED trenches and construct multiple checkpoints along its main entrance ways, urban environments provide a challenging scenario. Although there are some mitigating defenses that can be implemented in order to better safeguard specific buildings and sites, including bollards, checkpoints, etc., these countermeasures aren’t foolproof. Barring a complete vehicular shutdown of the urban environment – a logistical impossibility – attacks can still take place. Cities are extraordinarily vulnerable to SVBIED attacks due to the ever present nature and need of vehicles for transportation, a dynamic that’s been exploited by non-state actors for decades. However, the difficulty of countering SVBIEDs in an urban environment extends over into the up-armored category as well.

While military bases and outposts have the same defensive structures available to them in countering the conventional use of up-armored SVBIEDs, defenders also have the advantage of being able to fire on the attacking vehicle. However, as the improvised armor plating mounted on up-armored SVBIEDs is impervious to small arms fire and can withstand heavy machine gun fire as well [140], defenders usually require shoulder-launched rockets (e.g. RPG-7 or equivalent) in order to have a chance of disabling the modified vehicles. Paradoxically, it’s both easier to hit and more dangerous to destroy an SVBIED the closer it gets, as the kill range of the resulting blast may encompass the defenders as well [141]. Circumventing this issue, Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) platforms – which are relatively easy to operate – have a common range of up to five kilometers, rendering them the optimal counter-SVBIED weapon systems in open terrain [142].

Countering the use of up-armored SVBIEDs in an urban environment is extremely difficult, especially if the force using them is defending the city, as was exemplified by the arduous battle of Mosul. The narrow and sprawling road system of Mosul made the use of long-range ATGM platforms untenable, and the extremely short response times awarded to the attacking force as SVBIEDs appeared seemingly out of nowhere, made them heavily reliant on shoulder-launched rockets as their primary defensive weapons [143]. Although the US air force assisted in mitigating the urban SVBIED threat – partly by destroying staging areas and forward hide sites, but also with their use of preemptive air strikes in order to crater and deny specific attack routes – it’s unclear to what extent this facilitated the Iraqi pushes [144].

Counter-SVBIED cratering of Mosul roads by US air force. Photo from a February, 2017 IS video.
Counter-SVBIED cratering of Mosul roads by US air force. Photo from a February, 2017 IS video.

The attacking Iraqi forces in Mosul were struck by successful up-armored SVBIED attacks at least 130 times throughout the offensive, sometimes by multiple vehicles strategically placed in driveways and garages along routes IS predicted the Iraqis would take [145]. Ultimately, there is no foolproof catch-all system, just a series of mitigation strategies in the form of defensive structures, ISR, air strikes, and weapon systems. Having possession of and utilizing all these mitigation strategies is also not a guarantee for a successful defense, as the psychological and demoralizing impact the use of SVBIEDs has on a well-equipped but undisciplined defending force can result in military collapse and a rout despite fighting off a numerically weaker attack. While these mitigation strategies have to be adapted to their specific contexts, the urban environment remains the most challengingin terms of defending against both covert and up-armored SVBIED attacks.

Conclusion

In the past decade, the SVBIED has been adapted to a conventional military role by a multitude of non-state actors attempting to mirror the conventional as part of separate but similar quests to seize and hold territory. Although IS in Iraq and Syria stand out as an extreme outlier in terms of the sheer scale of their past SVBIED use, other IS contingents in both Libya and Nigeria – alongside Jabhat al-Nusra (now HTS) and the Taliban – have developed and refined similar conventional SVBIED programs. Between all of these groups, there are consistent and striking similarities in how up-armored SVBIEDs are both designed and employed. 

These similarities are not coincidental, but a byproduct of these non-state actors gaining military power and logically shifting their use from covert to up-armored SVBIEDs in order to maintain a powerful force multiplier in a changing tactical environment. Although this transition is often facilitated (as the direct transfer of technical expertise and know-how from IS in Syria/Iraq to Libya, and eventually Nigeria, highlights), it should logically be able to occur without direct exterior assistance. Non-state actors consume each other’s media and are inspired, which can lead to indirect facilitation. In one tangential example, the former head of the Taliban’s SVBIED program noted IS’ visually showcasing its use of improvised armed hobby drones in order to drop small munitions, and developed a similar program for his own organization [146]. Even without indirect facilitation, the repeatedly observed transition from using covert to up-armored SVBIEDs is rooted in the military-strategic logic of an increasingly powerful group progressing from operating as an irregular force to behaving more conventionally.

This process of ‘mirroring the conventional’ has lead observers and non-state actors themselves to compare the use of up-armored SVBIEDs on the conventional battlefield to “the poor man’s air force” – with non-state actors clearly understanding the weapon’s conventional military utility. Although the comparison is far more precise now than when it was first coined, the use of up-armored SVBIEDs constitute a compensation for lack of a better alternative, and not an equivalent counterpart to an actual air force. The balance of power that allowed IS in Iraq, Syria, Libya, as well as Jabhat al-Nusra (now HTS) the ability to effectively employ up-armored SVBIEDs as force multipliers in order to seize territory hinged on the weak state structure and poor nature of their opponents’ militaries and air forces. In all of these cases, the offensive potential of the up-armored SVBIED was neutered by the introduction of the US and Russian air forces, which together with local forces either completely eliminated their territorial control or effectively contained it. 

As HTS has been contained and the Taliban has taken over Afghanistan, neither of them are likely to pose a threat with regard to their use of up-armored SVBIEDs. While both non-state actors have narrowly defined territorial goals, Afghanistan is the most worrisome of the two, though primarily because of ISKP. Despite their lack of resource availability and comparatively low use of up-armored SVBIEDs, ISWAP currently stands out as the greatest threat with regard to its use of up-armored SVBIEDs. The insufficient countermeasures in place (including the Nigerian air force and the MNJTF) are unlikely to be able to prevent ISWAP expansion if the current stalemate is broken.

The complete loss of overt territorial control with IS in Iraq, Syria and Libya has also showcased the highly adaptable nature of the SVBIED, as they have all reverted back to using covert SVBIEDs. This shows how non-state actors are able to seamlessly transition back and forward between the use of covert and up-armored types depending on their situations. Although the defeat of IS’ territorial ‘caliphate’ across Iraq, Syria, and Libya was hailed as a success, it won’t remain a success unless military pressure is maintained on these non-state actors. 

In Libya, IS conducted their first SVBIED attack in over three years on June 7, 2021 – a covert SVBIED attack against an LNA checkpoint near Sabha, central Libya – killing a police commander [147]. The widely publicized attack was followed by a second, albeit failed SVBIED attack against another checkpoint two months later [148]. Seeing as conducting, claiming and releasing footage of SVBIED attacks is risky for weak non-state actors as it puts the spotlight directly on them, these events suggest that IS in Libya have regenerated some of its operational capabilities in the face of previous failed attempts at reemerging [149] and continuing US air strikes [150].

In Iraq, US and Coalition assistance with ISR and air strikes remains crucial as complacent Iraqi forces are incapable of independently conducting counterinsurgency operations [151]. Though IS remains a low-level insurgency in the country, the group has regenerated part of its operational capabilities, evidenced by a double suicide bombing in Baghdad in January [152] and another suicide bombing in Baghdad in July 2021 [153], both of which killed more than 30 people. More recently though, IS carried out a covert SVBIED attack in October, 2021 against a police station in Ramadi, a step up from the parked VBIEDs typically used in recent years [154].

Across the border in Syria, IS is also mounting an increasingly powerful insurgency. In the nominally loyalist-held central Syrian desert, IS have been evading counterinsurgency operations for years, killing hundreds of soldiers [155]. On the other side of the Euphrates, IS have similarly stepped up its attacks. In early October, the SDF raided an IS cell preparing to conduct a covert SVBIED attack in Raqqah [156]. A month later, a US air strike detonated a massive SVBIED [157] as SDF raided another cell preparing to mount a jail break in Hasakah province [158]. In January 2022, IS would go on to use two covert SVBIEDs in order to initiate a jailbreak at the same prison, a massive security mishap on the part of SDF that turned into a week-long siege of the prison and adjacent neighborhoods [159]. This was a major show of force by IS, and being a non-state actor itself, the SDF is even more reliant on US and Coalition ISR and air strikes as part of its counterinsurgency efforts than the Iraqi Army [160].

Given enough breathing room and operational freedom, IS and other non-state actors using covert SVBIEDs will act on that opportunity in order to regain strength and eventually overt territorial control. Seeing as these non-state actors are extraordinarily patient and structure their end goals for the long-term, it’s likely that more foreign forces will withdraw from armed conflicts in the absence of clear-cut military victories. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan signifies the lethargy-inducing longevity of these missions, and has emboldened other militant non-state actors. With this in mind, the future will likely see more cases of transitions between covert and up-armored SVBIEDs, alongside the further spread of SVBIED information and know-how.

The second part of this article series will discuss strategic logic of covert SVBIEDs and the most potent non-state actors currently using them; JNIM and al-Shabaab. Both of these groups have begun transitioning to the use of up-armored SVBIEDs, but face constraints similar to the non-state actors employing up-armored SVBIEDs.

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  125. “An ISWAP up-armored SVBIED disabled by Nigerian forces”
  126. “Capture from ISWA after a large attack (incl. an ambush on reinforcements) on the town of Askira Uba.”
  127. “This is very interesting. ISWAP has constructed a DIY troop carrier vehicle/technical by transplanting sections of a captured Isotrex Phantom 2 hull onto a (likely) Toyota pick-up chassis.”
  128. “What was more notable to me was if the theme of the recent video frm Iraq was”>”More of the Same” then this one is “Build Back Better”; ISWA are extremely well equipped with weapons captured frm regional states (Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria); pics show IS operating a MOWAG Piranha AFV.”
  129. “What was more notable to me was if the theme of the recent video frm Iraq was”>”More of the Same” then this one is “Build Back Better”; ISWA are extremely well equipped with weapons captured frm regional states (Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria); pics show IS operating a MOWAG Piranha AFV.”
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  134. “Boko Haram fighters pledge to Islamic State in video, worrying observers”, Reuters (2021)”
  135. “Breaking the Boko Haram-Nigerian military stalemate: Can supercamps sustain the status quo?”, Zenn, Jacob, Politique etrangere (2021), Vol. 1, pp. 177-190.
  136. “Car Bombs as Weapons of War: ISIS’s Development of SVBIEDs, 2014-19”, Middle East Institute, Hugo Kaaman (2019).
  137. Ibid.
  138. “Survival-And-Expansion-of-the-Islamic-States-West-African-Province.pdf”
  139. “Car Bombs as Weapons of War: ISIS’s Development of SVBIEDs, 2014-19”, Middle East Institute, Hugo Kaaman (2019)
  140. “Islamic State SVBIED development and innovation in the battle for Mosul, October 2016-June 2017”, Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Centre, Hugo Kaaman (2018).
  141. “IS group suicide vehicles force Iraqi army to change strategy”, France24 (2016).
  142. “Islamic State SVBIED development and innovation in the battle for Mosul, October 2016-June 2017”, Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Centre, Hugo Kaaman (2018).
  143. Ibid.
  144. “Islamic State SVBIED development and innovation in the battle for Mosul, October 2016-June 2017”, Jane’s Terrorism & Insurgency Centre, Hugo Kaaman (2018).
  145. “The Drone Unit that Helped the Taliban Win the War”, Newlines Mag (2021).
  146. “An Explosive Renewal of The Islamic State in Libya?”, Hugo Kaaman, Calibre Obscura (2021).
  147. Ibid.
  148. Ibid.
  149. ”Air strikes target areas close to city centre of Libya’s Ubaru”, TRT World (2021).
  150. “Iraqi military still dependent on US, coalition military in ISIS fight: watchdog”, Military Times (2021),
  151. “Suicide Bombings in Crowded Baghdad Market Kill at Least 32”, New York Times (2021).
  152. “Islamic State group claims responsibility for deadly suicide bombings near Baghdad”, France24 (2021).
  153. “IS carried out a covert SVBIED attack against an Iraqi police station in Ramadi, Anbar this morning, resulting in 8 casualties & extensive damage.”
  154. “Islamic State Under-Reporting in Central Syria: Misdirection, Misinformation, or Miscommunication?”, Middle East Institute, Waters, Gregory (2021).
  155. “SDF prevents massive bombing in former ISIS capital”, Kurdistan24 (2021).
  156. “Footage showing the recent destruction of an IS!S weapons cache hidden in a warehouse. The explosives/weapons destroyed were originally going to be used in an attempted prison break in Hasakah foiled by SDF anti-terror units earlier this month.”
  157. “Kurdish-led forces foil jailbreak attempt at ISIS prison in Syria’s Hasakah”, Kurdistan24 (2021)
  158. “Trapped in Hasakah after the ISIS Prison Break”, Washington Institute (2022).
  159. “Iraqi military still dependent on US, coalition military in ISIS fight: watchdog”, Military Times (2021)

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